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COMMENT ON INGRAHAM'S "MORAL




Professor Barton L. Ingraham opened an illuminating debate
about fundamental legal principles usually assumed to be at the bed-
rock of American democracy in his reply1 to my article in this journal.
My article described how England's new limits to the right to silence
allow judges and juries to consider as evidence of guilt both a sus-
pect's failure to answer police questions during interrogation and a
defendant's refusal to testify during trial.2 Proponents of this new law
argued that it would "dissuade offenders from thwarting prosecution
simply by saying nothing," force suspects to confess, increase convic-
tions, and thereby reduce crime.3 Opponents countered that even
the innocent may "have valid reasons for remaining silent, and that
the proposal would not reduce crime, but rather would increase the
likelihood of coerced or false confessions and erroneous convic-
1 Barton L Ingraham, The Right of Silence, The Presumption of Innocence, The Burden of
Proof and a Modest ProposaL" A Reply to Oeily, 86J. CruM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 559 (1996).
2 Gregory W. O'Reilly, England Limits the Right to Silence and Moves Towards an Inquisito-
rial System of Justice, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 402 (1994). The new law, the Royal
Assent dated Nov. 3, 1994, effective March 1, 1995, contains four parts:
(1) judges andjurors may draw adverse inferences when suspects do not tell the police
during interrogation a fact relied upon by the defense at trial if, under the circum-
stances, the suspect could have been expected to mention the fact; (2) if the accused
does not testify, judges and prosecutors may invite the jury to make any inference
which to them appears proper-including the "common sense" inference that there is
no explanation for the evidence produced against the accused and that the accused is
guilty, (3) judges and jurors may draw an adverse inference when suspects fail to re-
spond to police questions about any suspicious objects, substances, or marks which are
found on their persons or clothing or in the place where they were arrested; and (4)judges andjurors may draw adverse inferences if suspects do not explain to the police
why they were present at a place at or about the time of the offense for which they
were arrested.
Id. at 403-04 (internal citations omitted).
3 Id at 403 (citing Editorial, Howard's Beginning THE TimEs (London), Oct. 7, 1993, at
17).
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tions."4 Opponents also argued that the new limits to the right would
"undermine the presumption of innocence and erode England's accu-
satorial system of justice."5
Along with others, I argued that limiting the right to silence
would have significant effects on the accusatorial system ofjustice be-
cause the right exists to stall the engine which drives the inquisitorial
system-the power to encourage, require, or force individuals to an-
swer to government questioning. By adopting the use of adverse infer-
ences from the refusal to speak, England has curtailed the right to
silence and replaced it with a duty to talk. In doing so, England has
stepped back toward an inquisitorial system, a retreat which will affect
not only the criminal justice system but also the character of the rela-
tionship between the citizen and the state.
Professor Ingraham disagreed, and took issue with the key ele-
ments of the accusatory system of justice-the presumption of inno-
cence, the right to silence, and the burden and standard of proof. For
Professor Ingraham, it is "no longer clear" that the hazard of criminal
sanction is still sufficiently severe to require the protections of the ac-
cusatorial system.6 He seeks to ensure that suspects and defendants
honor a proposed moral duty to talk.7 Professor Ingraham's reply ech-
oes themes from his previous writings. He has argued that the accusa-
torial criminal justice system is a "circus of illusions and deception"8
and a "perfect tool for keeping facts out of sight."9 He has also argued
4 Id. at 403 (citing Editorial, The Right to Silknce THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 1994, at 17;
See THE ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIMINALJUSTICE, REPORT, 1993, Cmnd. 2263 [hereinafter 1993
REPORT]; see also ROGER LENG, THE ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RESEARCH STUDY
No. 10 (1993). Reasons for silence include "the protection of family or friends, a sense of
bewilderment, embarrassment or outrage, or a reasoned decision to wait until the allega-
tion against them has been set out in detail and they have had the benefit of considered
legal advice." 1993 REPORT, at 52.
5 O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 403 (citing Michael Zander, Editorial, Abandoning an An-
cient Right to Please the Police, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 6, 1993, at 25 (the right to
silence is "based on the presumption of innocence, and reflects the burden thrown on the
prosecution to prove the defendant guilty, without any assistance from the defendant if he
so chooses"));JohnJackson, Inferences from Silence: From Common Law to Common Sense, 44 N.
IRELAND LEGAL Q. 103, 108 (1993); O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 403, n.8 ("The use of adverse
inferences after the prosecution has established only a prima facie case shifts a burden to
the accused to testify or have his silence aid the prosecution in carrying its burden of
proof. This violates the accusatorial principle that it is the prosecution's duty to prove the
accused's guilt."); Editorial, The Right to Silence, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 1994, at 17 ("tak-
ing issue with the move to curtail the right to silence, arguing that it is an assault on the
presumption of innocence and the burden of proof").
6 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 575.
7 Id. at 566.
8 Barton L Ingraham, The Ethics of Testimony: Conflicting Views on the Role of the Criminol-
ogist as Expet Witness, in EXPERT WITNESSES, CRIMINOLOGISTS IN THE COURTROOM 179 (Pat-
rick R. Anderson and L. Thomas Winfree, Jr., eds., 1987).
9 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 594.
[Vol. 87
REPLY TO INGRAHAM
that "American lawyers" perpetuate "myths" about the system, namely
that judicial independence protects the citizen against overreaching
government, that the adversary system utilizes neutral magistrates in a
contest from which the truth emerges, 10 and that official power must
be checked to assure liberty." He has referred to the American dis-
trust of leaving "too much to the discretion of officials" as "American
parochialism," 12 and dismissed distinctions between legal systems-in-
cluding those of totalitarian regimes-regarding the value they place
on the protection of the innocent from conviction.13 The stark con-
trast between Professor Ingraham's views and my own may help to
clarify why American lawyers believe and practice as we do, and why
we have not only a tradition supporting the right to silence, but a
commitment to it as a primary value in our jurisprudence.
While English proponents of limiting the right to silence offered
in trade the dubious promise of reduced crime, Professor Ingraham
offered only a moral justification. He made light of any competing
concerns, such as the risk that more innocent people will be convicted
of crimes, or that the change may increase state power at the expense
of individual liberty. In advocating a duty to talk, Professor Ingraham
minimized its significance, contending that I offered "patently un-
true" or "unverified statements" about the significance of the new
law.14 While he questioned the value of the accusatorial system and
suggested that it should be diminished, he asserted the new law does
not move the Englishjustice system from the accusatorial towards the
inquisitorial model, and argued that I perpetuated "myths" about the
accusatorial and inquisitorial systems.15
In addition to defending England's new law, Professor Ingraham
offered his own proposal for, among other things, imposing a duty to
talk and reducing the standard and burden of proof.16 He conceded
that his proposal would "require the revision of the American pre-
sumption of innocence doctrine and the overruling of a whole series
of Supreme Court cases, and therefore, it may strike the reader as a
purely academic exercise."17 It so strikes this reader. My response
deals with Ingraham's defense of the new English law, his critique of
my article, his dismissal of the need for the protections of the Ameri-
can accusatorial system of justice and his unconvincing justification
10 BARTON L. INGRAHAM, THE STRucruRE OF CRIMiNAL PROCEDURE 8-9 (1987).
11 Id. at 33-34.
12 Id at 33.
13 Id.
14 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 590.
15 Id. at 559-60.
16 Id. at 580-87.
17 Id. at 580.
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for a duty to talk. Professor Ingraham's attempt to make a duty to talk
seem benign by diminishing its significance and blurring the distinc-
tions between accusatorial and inquisitorial systems requires this re-
ply, for as Justice Bradley warned "illegitimate and unconstitutional
practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent ap-
proaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure."' 8
II. Do WE STILL NEED AN ACCUSATORY CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM?
Professor Ingraham argued "for treating criminal and civil cases
more alike procedurally than they traditionally have been"19 because
"rationalizations"20 for the procedural differences cited by the United
States Supreme Court, such as "the stigmatizing effect of a criminal
conviction," and the "nature and severity" of the criminal sanction,21
"may have been true in the past, but they are far less true today." He
compared the past, when death was the only penalty for a felony, with
the present, where fines and probation are the most common penal-
ties imposed by the criminal courts. 2 2 Relying on figures from 1985,
Professor Ingraham noted that 1,870,132 persons were placed on pro-
bation and 757,409 were serving time in state and federal jails and
prisons, thus "about 70% of all offenders" are placed on probation.23
Professor Ingraham found it "very unlikely" that "this situation ... has
changed much in the decade following publication of these statis-
tics."24 He is wrong to believe that, because parole is more common
than prison, the severity of American criminal sanction is somehow
diminished. Imprisonment was not "rare" in 1985, and it has esca-
lated dramatically in the last decade. The available current data
reveals that, at the end of 1994, 1.5 million people were behind bars
in America. Of these, most-958,704---were in state prisons, 95,034
were in federal prisons, and 483,717 were in local jails.25 One year
later nearly 1.6 million people were behind bars, with 1,078,357 in
state and federal prisons, an increase of 8.7 percent; and 507,044 in
18 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1885);James Madison, Speech in the Viginia
Convention, Richmond Va., June 6, 1788, in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 79 (Robert A.
Rutland and Charles F. Hobson eds., 1979).
19 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 576.
20 Id. at 574.
21 Id. at 572 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970)).
22 Id. at 574.
23 Id. at 574 n.37.
24 Id. (citing Probation and Parole 1985, BJS BULLETIN (Jan. 1987), and BUREAU OFJUS-
TICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 102
(2d ed. 1988)).
25 See U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Nation's Correctional Population Tops 5 Million, Aug. 27, 1995
(press release); Fox Butterfield, More in U.S. Are in Prisons, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,
1995, at A14 (an additional 3.5 million persons on parole or probation).
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local jails, an increase of 4.2 percent.26 By 1995, America had the
world's highest incarceration rate, far exceeding the rates of any other
industrialized nation, and five to ten times higher than the incarcera-
tion rates of Western European nations.27 Serious offenders are typi-
cally not sentenced to probation, but to prison. The Department of
Justice reported that in 1992, sixty percent of persons convicted of
violent offenses were sentenced to prison, and another twenty-one
percent were sentenced to time in local jails, often reflecting long pre-
trial stays.28 Over eighty percent of persons convicted of violent of-
fenses spend time behind bars.2 9
Relying on 1983 figures, Professor Ingraham found that the aver-
age sentence for serious felonies was between about three and six
years, while the actual time prisoners served "was, on the average,
much less than these figures would indicate."30 He concluded that
"[1] ong-term imprisonment is also rare, although it has become more
frequent in the last few years."3' Professor Ingraham is wrong: long-
term imprisonment is far from rare. The Department of Justice re-
ported that from 1992 through 1994 the average person convicted of
a violent offense was sentenced to ten years in prison and would serve
slightly less than five years in prison.32 In 1991, thirty-four percent of
American inmates were serving sentences of at least ten years, and
another six percent were serving either life or death sentences. In
England and Wales, by contrast, only four percent were serving
sentences of ten or more years, and an additional eight percent were
serving life sentences.33 Differences in early release practices did not
26 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES,
1995, at 2 (1996); Prison Population Doubles in Decade, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 19, 1996, at 3. By
midyear 1996, an estimated 1,630,940 persons were in America's jails in prisons. BUREAU
OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PRISON ANDJAIL INMATES, 1996, at 1 (1997).
27 According to the Sentencing Project, based on Justice Department figures for the
twelve months endingJune 30, 1995, America's rate of 565 per 100,000 surpasses Russia's
1993 rate of 558 per 100,000. Linnet Myers, Prison Population is Soaring in U.S., CHI. TRIB.,
Dec. 4, 1995, at 3. By comparison, European incarceration rates per 100,000 ranged from
49 in the Netherlands, to 80 in Italy, to 93 in England and Wales. Linnet Myers, Cultural
Divide over Crime and Punishment, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 13, 1995, at 1; Prison Population Doubles in
Decade CI. TRIMB., Aug. 19, 1996, at 8 (one out of every 167 Americans is in prison or jail).
28 See BuaEAu OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE
COURTS, 1992, at 2 tbl.2 (1995).
29 Id.
30 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 574-75, n.38 (citing Prison Admissions and Releases, BJS
SPECIAL REPORT (1986) and BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, REPORT
TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 100 (2d ed. 1988)).
3' Id. at 574.
32 See BURAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENT OFFENDERS IN
STATE PRISON: SENTENCES AND TIME SERVED 2 (1995).
3 See BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROFILE OF INMATES IN THE
UNITED STATES AND IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1991, at 7 (1994).
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eliminate the differences in time served,34 and these statistics are from
before the "truth-in-sentencing" laws went into effect and dramatically
increased the time actually served in American prisons.35 Having rep-
resented persons facing both the death penalty and long prison terms,
and having visited the jails and prisons where they languish, I find it
hard to take seriously Professor Ingraham's musings that "[i]t is no
longer clear" as to "[w] hich is more severe, a fine, probation, short-
term incarceration or a civil damage award, the amount of which may
be sufficiently high to destroy a business or strip one of one's earnings
and savings, not only in the present but in the future as well."36
While Professor Ingraham asserted the death penalty "is imposed
and carried out so seldomly [sic] as to hardly count as a punish-
ment,"37 it has been imposed on 3,122 persons who are awaiting exe-
cution on America's death rows in 1996,88 and by early 1996, it had
been carried out on more than 330 people since executions resumed
in 1977.39 In 1993, thirty-eight persons were executed in America. In
1994, thirty-one persons were executed. Fifty-six people were exe-
cuted in 1995, and by September 18, 1996, thirty-two persons had
been executed. 40 Experts expect the pace of executions to increase
dramatically under the habeas corpus reforms passed by Congress in
1996. 41 Can Professor Ingraham seriously compare an execution with
a money judgment?
Professor Ingraham minimized the severity of the stigmatizing ef-
fects of conviction today, comparing it to old England, where felons
were often branded. Without citation, he asserted that: "Today, in
the United States, loss of reputation and social standing counts for
little among the vast majority of lower-class offenders, especially
juveniles, and in the higher ranks of society, wealth, celebrity, and mo-
bility often remove the stigma of a criminal conviction."42 These as-
34 Id. at 8 (notes that authors viewed early release reduction of sentence in England as
one-half of sentence versus one-third in the U.S.). Between 1992 and 1994, however, vio-
lent offenders' percentage of time to served rose from 44% to 48%. BuREAU OF JusTICE
STATISTICS, supra note 26, at 2.
35 For the example of Illinois, see Gregory W. O'Reilly, Trtth-in-Sentencing, Illinois Adds
Yet Another Layer of "Reform" to its Complicated Code of Corrections, 27 Loy. U. CHL LJ. 985
(1996).
36 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 574-75.
37 Id. at 574.
38 See NAACP LEGAL DEFENsE FUND, DEATH Row U.S.A. (Spring 1996).
39 See it Capital punishment was reinstated in 1976.
40 Telephone interview, National Coalition for the Abolition of the Death Penalty.
41 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§§ 101-08, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26; Telephone Interview with National Coalition to Abolish
the Death Penalty, supra note 40 (predicting an increase in the number of executions due
to habeas corpus reforms).
42 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 575.
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sertions will be difficult to measure, unless Professor Ingraham
specifies the dividing line between "lower class" and the "higher
ranks." Moreover, it is plain that the average lay person would not
find it easy to seek ajob as a felon, or enjoy the "celebrity" of being
known as the felon next-door in the average American neighborhood.
One could experience the more extreme forms of stigma by register-
ing under one of the nation's many new sex offender registration and
community notification laws.43
III. INGRAHAM'S PoLL-DEvrED MoRAL "DUr TO TAiK"
In seeking to eliminate crucial elements of the accusatorial sys-
tem, Professor Ingraham would replace the legal right to silence with
a moral duty to talk. Professor Ingraham believes that a dichotomy
exists between the morality of the American lawyer and the common
man, arguing that the school-taught lawyers' "moral stance" is "alien"
to the average lay person.44 According to the lay person's "common-
sensica" view, the best way to reach "fully informed decisions" is "by
hearing from the defendant-"45 From this lay person's view, Professor
Ingraham suggested a moral duty to talk:
If a person is morally or legally accountable for his conduct, he owes a
moral duty to answer questions relevant to that conduct to persons in
authority... whenever a sufficient basis exists for conducting such an
inquiry... Every citizen or resident guest of a community has a duty to
give frank answers to relevant questions concerning a crime to police
46
While Professor Ingraham did not distinguish between a moral
and a legal duty, English precedent has held that even if there were
what some consider a moral duty to talk, there is no such legal duty,
and that "the whole basis of the common law is that right of the indi-
vidual to refuse to answer questions put to him by persons in authority
... ."47 For Professor Ingraham, however, the moral duty should en-
tail the legal duty. This follows from the position which Professor In-
graham took in his book, The Structure of Criminal Procedure, where he
contended that criminal procedure follows natural law, a "fundamen-
tal order of society and of nature which commands all human laws to
conform to its norms."48 For Professor Ingraham, this natural law is
43 Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591, 631-32
(1996).
44 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 560.
45 Id. at 565.
46 Id. at 566.
47 1993 REPORT, supra note 4, at 49 (quoting Rice v. Connolly, 2 Q.B. 414 (1966)).
48 Ingraham, supra note 10, at 123 ("That such an order exists is the basic assumption
of all social scientists, although few would be so bold as to claim all human laws must
1997]
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equally apparent to the layman and the lawyer, because "rules of jus-
tice and of good, are plain alike to simple and to wise."49 To make the
duty effective, there must be a sanction applied for its violation. Pro-
fessor Ingraham agrees with the use of adverse inferences as the sanc-
tion so that the trier-of-fact may infer whatever is reasonable from
"obdurate silence," including the inference that the suspect is "con-
scious of his guilt... because he has something to conceal... proba-
bly his involvement in the ... crime."50
Professor Ingraham measured his lay person's morality (and per-
haps natural law) by the unreliable yardstick of a 1993 Gallup Poll5'
which found, according to Professor Ingraham, that sixty-four percent
of those polled strongly or somewhat agreed that a defendant should
be required to prove his or her innocence, that fifty-six percent
strongly or somewhat strongly disagreed that it is better to let some
guilty people go free than to risk convicting an innocent person, and
that seventy percent agreed that the criminal justice system makes it
too hard for the police and prosecutors to convict people accused of
crimes.52 A 1991 Roper poll, however, found that fifty-nine percent of
that sample thought-or opined-that the right to remain silent
when charged with a crime should be guaranteed by the Constitution,
while an additional twenty-five percent opined that it should be guar-
anteed by regular law but not by the Constitution. Only eleven per-
cent opined that it should not be guaranteed at all.53 That comes to
eighty-four percent in favor of the right to remain silent. So much for
a poll-derived moral consensus against the accusatory system of
justice.
More important, polls are a dubious means of testing either mo-
rality or good sense, and are even of questionable value in gauging
public opinion. While a poll may reveal the passions of the moment,
public opinion changes. In 1991, polls indicated that George Bush's
personal approval rating exceeded ninety percent.54 The next year,
he lost the election. The time a poll is taken may influence its results.
conform to it.").
49 Id. at 123, 171 n.7 (quoting HUGo GRorius, THE LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE 23 (Francis
W. Kelsey trans., 1962)).
50 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 567.
51 GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP PoLL PUBLIC OPINION 1993, at 231-32 (1994).
52 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 560 ("I cite these results to show that a majority of Ameri-
cans probably do not share with lawyers the basic beliefs and principles underlying the
operation of our criminal justice system.").
53 Bob Baker, The Times Poll: Nation Divided on Wt Law Should Allow, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
14, 1991, at 28. The LA Times poll asked questions of 1,709 randomly selected adults
between November 21, 1991 and November 24, 1991.
54 Edwin Yoder, Editorial, Learning from Polls: Garbage In, Garbage Out, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, July 12, 1996, at 7B.
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Indeed some polls are taken for the purpose of revealing the opinion
of a particular moment, rather than a more general public opinion.
This is the case in the poll cited by Professor Ingraham which was
taken at the time the jury was selected in the federal trial of the police
officers accused of beating Rodney King, and replicated questions
used during jury selection.55 The trial attracted great public attention
and outrage, in part because the officers had previously been acquit-
ted by a state court jury in Simi Valley. 56 The poll illuminated the
passions of the moment feared by defense attorneys, who worried that
at that particular time the public, and potential jurors, would be in-
clined to believe the criminal justice system had made it too difficult
to convict the officers in the first case, require the officers to prove
their innocence, and err on the side of conviction.57 It is ironic that
Professor Ingraham used questions aimed at eliminating the passions
of the moment from the officers' trial to justify tailoring the entire
criminal justice system to fit those passions.
Polls can also be inadvertently or intentionally manipulated by
pollsters, or by those who cite them.58 Professor Ingraham, for in-
stance, cited the Gallup poll to demonstrate that A majority of sixty-
four percent strongly or somewhat agreed that a defendant should be
required to prove his or her innocence. It is a dubious practice, how-
ever, to reach a majority by adding those who only somewhat agreed
with the proposition to those who strongly supported it. Given only a
choice to support or oppose the proposition, a majority might have
opposed it. Such a choice was not given in the poll cited. The actual
poll reported that forty-five percent-a minority-strongly agreed
with the proposition, while nineteen percent somewhat agreed.59
While Professor Ingraham contended that a majority of fifty-six per-
cent strongly or somewhat strongly disagreed that it is better to let
some guilty people go free than to risk convicting an innocent person,
the actual poll reported that only about one-third of those polled,
thirty-four percent, strongly disagreed, while twenty-two percent some-
what agreed.60
55 Roper Center at University of Connecticut, Public Opinion Online (1994) (Nos.
0224292, 0224293, 0224296).
56 Laurie L. Levenson, What if the King jwy Again is Mostly White?, LA TImEs, Feb. 9,
1993, at 7.
57 GALLUP, supra note 51, at 231.
58 Bob Garfield, I Hear America Yakking, Seven Good Reasons Why Public Opinion Polling
Should Be Banned., WASH. Posr, Nov. 5, 1995, (Magazine), at W10 ("Sometimes the result is
what Gary Orren of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government has called 'very vague no-
tions masquerading as opinion.'") [hereinafter IHearAmercia Yakking].
59 GLup, supra note 51, at 231.
60 Id. at 232.
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Moreover, there is no gauge of the extent to which opinions re-
flected in a poll might be trivial and uninformed.61 Most polls mea-
sure uninformed or unformed opinions. Studies aimed at gauging
deliberate, informed opinions indicate that people subjected to in-
tense education on an issue often change their opinions. In Britain,
for example, after being informed about the issue, the percentage of
persons believing that suspects should have the right to remain silent
under police questioning rose from thirty-six to fifty percent.62
Professor Ingraham bolstered his hypothetical lay person's case
against the accusatory model by arguing that "[t] o the average lay per-
son the allocation of proof in a civil tort or criminal trial makes no
sense at all," a remark which he based upon his "more than twenty
years ... attempting to teach American criminal law to college stu-
dents .... -63 It seems a stretch, however, to judge as nonsense what
fails to make sense to the average college student, no matter how su-
perb their teacher.
IV. POLLS, MAJORITIES, AND CONSTITUTIONS
In- his enthusiasm for majorities, Professor Ingraham dismissed-
and missed-the point of a constitutional right, and the value of the
experience of history, rebutting straw-man arguments which I never
made in favor of the elements of the accusatory system of justice.64
Dismissing these arguments, Professor Ingraham's idealized lay per-
son concluded that "many of these doctrines make no moral or practi-
cal sense," and that the Gallup poll's lay person majority "is right and
American lawyers are wrong."6 5 Justice Brennan warned of this moral
populism, quoting legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart, "'It seems fatally
easy to believe that loyalty to democratic principles entails acceptance
of what may be termed moral populism: the view that the majority
have a moral right to dictate how all should live.' This, he said, is 'a
misunderstanding of democracy which still menaces individual
61 I Hear America Yakking, supra note 58.
62 Polling, Box Popui, ECONOMiST, July 27, 1996, at 73, 74. Ingraham contends that "It
takes a considerable amount of sophisticated exegesis and constant repetition to convince
the ordinary lay person of the rationality and morality of these viewpoints." Ingraham,
supra note 1, at 560. Maybe a little education and deliberation would be enough.
63 Id. at 565 n.14.
64 Ingraham does not rebut serious justifications. Instead he characterizes arguments
about tradition as "this is the way we have always done things in this country"; and "this way
is hallowed in tradition, was instituted by our Founding Fathers in our Constitution." He
characterizes arguments about authority as: "this way has been decreed by the Supreme
Court of the United States"; or "bogus appeals to our xenophobia": "Our way stands in






Constitutional lights protect individual liberty, often against the
transitory whims of a majority. As Justice Brennan has noted, "the
point of having a bill of rights supported by judicial review... is to...
remove certain rights from the dailyjoust of politics, to protect minor-
ities ... from the passions or fears of political majorities."67 The effec-
tiveness of constitutional rights hinges on the fact that they may be
"amended only by supermajoritarian procedures.., and may not be
brushed aside whenever a legislative majority deems them dispensa-
ble."68 While to Professor Ingraham the courts have imposed
straighjackets, Justice Brennan viewed the courts as a "calmer, cooler
party to a dialogue from which the community benefits over time."69
These views were echoed by Professor Donald Dripps, a Fifth Amend-
ment skeptic, when he noted:
The conventional sources of constitutional law all point to a higher re-
gard for the privilege than contemporary analysis can substantiate. The
very point of a constitution is to prevent contemporary analysis from un-
dermining those principles that are vulnerable to the recurrent pres-
sures of the day, but nonetheless that have proved valuable by long
experience. 70
This "American" attitude has gained widespread adherents in Britain,
in a campaign for a "Bill of Rights for Britain."71
V. Mn.IMIZING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A DuTy TO TALK
I believe that the new English law took a step back toward an
inquisitorial system by imposing a duty to talk for a right to silence,
and sanctioning failures to adhere to the duty with an inference of
guilt. Professor Ingraham advocated the duty to talk, yet unconvinc-
ingly minimized its significance with arguments which include inaccu-
rate characterizations of my position.
A. A "MINOR CHANGE"
Professor Ingraham minimized the significance of the new Eng-
lish duty to talk, coyly characterizing it as only "minor procedural
changes,"72 which "may prove to be inconsequential in practice,"78
66 WilliamJ. Brennan, Jr., hy Have a Bill of Pdghts?, 9 OxFoRDJ. LEGAL STUDIES 425,
434 (1989) (quoting H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND Moa.rrAy 79 (1963)).
67 Id
68 I& at 427.
69 Id. at 433.
70 Donald A. Dripps, Self-Incrimination and Seif-Presewvation: A Skeptical View, 1991 U. ILL.
L REv. 329, 351.
71 Why Britain Needs a Bill of Pdghts, ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 1995, at 64.
72 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 592.
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and "hardly one that forces the defendant to abandon his silence."74 In
this he followed the lead of English proponents of adverse inferences
(the accused's silence "will simply become an item of evidence ...
scarcely a major infringement of a defendant's liberty.. . . ").75 Yet
Professor Ingraham conceded the significance of the change, noting
that I was "undoubtedly correct" from the American perspective in my
contention that imposing a duty to talk and sanctioning silence vio-
lates the presumption of innocence. 76 He also conceded that his own
plan to impose a duty to talk "may fly in the face of existing constitu-
tional law"77 and "require the revision of the American presumption
of innocence doctrine and the overruling of a whole series of
Supreme Court cases .... ,,78 Despite Professor Ingraham's attempt to
down-play its significance, the whole purpose of adverse inferences is
to discourage the use of the right to silence and to foster a to duty to
talk. As Paul Kauper noted, an adverse inference from silence "brings
a psychic pressure to bear on [the suspect] impelling him to speak
... ; in fact this pressure is the very object of this provision."79
Professor Ingraham also contended that, because the new law will
not meet its "crime control" goals of increasing the number of confes-
sions or reducing crime, it cannot "produce a major change" in due
process-"the burden of proof, presumption of innocence, and the
accusatorial system of justice."80 Yet, as the 1981 Royal Commission
report and English commentators have pointed out, the new law will
curtail the right to silence, reduce the burden of proof and erode the
presumption of innocence.8 '
Perhaps Professor Ingraham's views are in part the result of a mis-
conception about what the new law does. He contended without cita-
tion that, "at most," the new law:
gives the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence of his
73 Id. at 593.
74 Id. at 568.
75 Editorial, Howard's Beginning, TIMES (London), Oct. 7, 1993, at 17.
76 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 562.
77 Id. at 561.
78 Id. at 580.
79 Yale Kamisar, Kauper's YJudicial Examination ofthe Accused"Forty Years Later-Some Com-
ments on a RemarkabLe Artice 73 MICH. L. Rv. 15, 17 (1974), reprinted in YALE KAMISAR,
POuCE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 79 (1980) (quoting Paul G. KauperJudicialExam-
ination of the Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degrew, 30 MICH. L. REv. 1224, 1251 (1932))
(emphasis added; ellipses in original).
80 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 568, 591-92.
81 THE ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REPORT Cmnd. 8092, at 80-81, 86-87
[hereinafter 1981 REPORT]; David Dixon, Politics, Research and Symbolism in CiminalJustice:
The Right of Silence and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 20 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 27, 34-36
(1991); Steven Greer, The Right to Silence: A Review of the Current Debate, 53 MOD. L. REv.
709, 710, 725 (1990); see also O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 403, 405.
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innocence when he has no other extrinsic evidence (other witnesses, physical,
demonstrative, expert and scientific) to offer in opposition to the state's
case and when that case is strong enough to convict 8 2
In fact, the new law does not permit the suspect or the accused to
avoid adverse inferences from his or her silence by offering the testi-
mony of another witness. It requires the suspect or the accused to talk
or face adverse inferences from silence.83 Moreover, the adverse in-
ference may be drawn, not only when the state's case is "strong
enough to convict," but when the state has established a prima fade
case.
B. THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
In seeking to bolster his argument that the new law creates "no
major change" in the burden of proof or presumption of innocence,
Professor Ingraham rebutted exaggerated claims I never made, argu-
ing, for instance, that the new law does not totaUy remove the pre-
sumption of innocence or convert the justice system from accusatorial
to inquisitorial.8 4 In the following three instances, he incompletely
quoted my assertion, overlooked -support for it, -and erroneously
termed it "patenty untrue" or "unverified":
(1) The new English law shifts the burden of proof to the accused
by making them talk to the police during interrogation and then go for-
ward with evidence through their own testimony... [or] the court will penalize
them with an inference of guilt.8 5 As the 1981 Royal Commission report
noted, adverse inferences from silence "reverse the onus of proof at
82 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 591-92 (emphasis added).
83 Under the new law "if he chooses not to give evidence, or... refuses to answer any
question" he faces adverse inference. O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 427-30, n.152 and accompa-
nying text (citing The CriminalJustice and Public Order Act, 1994, Part III, § 35 (Eng.)).
84 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 593. Ingraham asserts that it "cannot be said that it [the
new law] totally removes a presumption of innocence or converts the justice system from
accusatorial to inquisitorial." Id, (emphasis added). Ingraham fails to page reference my
article, because no such contention was made. I asserted that curtailing the right to silence
and replacing it with a duty to talk would "undermine" the presumption of innocence and
that with such a change, England "moved towards" an inquisitorial system. O'Reilly, supra
note 2, at 445, 449. Again setting up a straw man, Ingraham says that the new law "does not
shift the burden of proving all the essential elements of the crime from the prosecution to
the defendant." Ingraham, supra note 1, at 590 (emphasis added). I made no such
contention.
85 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 590 (citing O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 445; italics for omit-
ted portions of assertion). I discussed support for this assertion, which includes the new
law itself- "if he chooses not to give evidence ... or refuses to answer any question... [he
faces adverse inferences]," O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 428 n.152 and accompanying text, 427-
30; the views of English commentators; and the Murray case construing the similar law in
effect in Northern Ireland, where the House of Lords ruled that it was acceptable for the
inference to be "that the accused is guilty." Murray v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1
W.LR. 1 H.L (N.I.) (1994); Dixon, supra note 81, at 32-34; Greer, supra note 81, at 724;
O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 427-29 nn.161-62 and accompanying text.
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trial" contrary to the "golden thread" which runs through the English
criminal justice system, that is, the requirement that "the prosecution
prove the prisoner's guilt."8 6
(2) Under the new law, if the prosecution establishes a prima facie
case-even if it falls short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt-the ac-
cused will have to testify or the prosecutor's case will be bolstered by an inference
of the accused's guilt.8 7
(3) Adverse inferences undermine the presumption of innocence
by forcing suspects to explain away their alleged involvement in a crime
or face the inference that there is no explanation and that they are guilty.8 8
Professor Ingraham quarreled with my analogy between adverse
inferences and the confession pro confesso,8 9 and asserted that suspects
and the accused should not "have their silence treated legally as if it
were tantamount to a confession of guilt."90 Yet that is just what he
advocated. If defendants, by remaining silent, fail to carry their new
burden to present an explanation, the court may penalize them with
an inference of guilt. This is a sanction which resembles the confes-
sion pro confesso, by which silent suspects were treated as if they had
confessed.9 1
VI. THE RIGHT TO SILENCE AND THE ACCUSATORIAL SYSTEM
Professor Ingraham argued that in my article I perpetuated
"myths" exaggerating the differences between the accusatorial and in-
quisitorial system, especially concerning the importance of the right
to silence in the accusatory system, and the benefits that flow from
86 1981 REPORT, supra note 81, at 80 (quoting Woolmington v. DDP AC 462 (1935) and
Lord Sankey).
87 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 590; O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 446 (italics for omitted
portions of assertion). I discussed support for this assertion, which includes the new law,
O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 427-30; the Murray case, the remarks of an English commentator,
and the Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice. Id. at 446 n.270 and accom-
panying text.
88 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 590; O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 445 (italics for omitted
portions of assertion). He omits mention of my discussion of support for this assertion,
which includes the new law itself and Murray. O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 427-30, 429 nn.161-
62. Ingraham himself concedes that:
[I]t violates the "presumption of innocence" to require a suspect to respond to police
questions in certain circumstances or to insist that a defendant respond to accusations
by testifying at his trial... and in the absence of a defendant's testimony to permit the
jury to draw adverse inferences of guilt from the defendant's failure to testify ....
[F]rom the perspective of the American doctrine, O'Reilly is undoubtedly correct.
Ingraham, supra note 1, at 562 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Griffen v. Cali-
fornia, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)).
89 Id. at 592.
90 Id. at 566.
91 O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 445 (citing LEONARD W. LEvy, ORIGINS OF THE FIFH AMEND-
MENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 13, 23-24 (2d ed. 1986)).
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that system.92 I pointed out, as did the 1981 Royal Commission and
English commentators, that curtailing the right to silence moves the
justice system from the accusatorial towards the inquisitorial system. 93
While denying this, Professor Ingraham himself noted that the distinc-
tion between systems regarding the right to silence is perhaps their
"greatest difference." 94 He conceded that ours is a predominately "ac-
cusatorial" system, 95 and conceded that such systems "go very far in
protecting and fostering this right."96 He contrasted this accusatorial
approach with "inquisitorial" systems, which "are more open to the
idea that persons accused of crimes should be encouraged to offer
evidence of their innocence to the police and cooperate with them."
97
Inquisitorial systems, he noted, allow adverse inferences from si-
lence.98 Professor Ingraham also discussed this distinction between
these systems regarding the right to silence in his book The Structure of
Criminal Procedure, in which he contrasted the "American" system with
"inquisitorial" systems.99
VII. THE RIGHT TO SILENCE, THE ACCUSATORIAL SYSTEM, AND
LIMITED GOVERNMENT
While Professor Ingraham denied that a connection exists be-
tween limited, democratic government, accusatorial procedure, and
the right to silence, 00 a significant body of scholarship takes a con-
trary view. Professor Miran Damaska, among other comparative law
92 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 560. Ingraham also asserts that "the way it contrasts two
procedural systems as they actually exist today is both inaccurate and one-sided." Id. at 590.
93 1981 REPORT, supra note 81, at 80-81, 86, 87; Dixon, supra note 81, at 32-34; Greer,
supra note 81, at 710, 725.
94 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 564.
95 Id. at 564 n.12. Professor Ingraham asserts that in my article "no account is given to
those inquisitorial elements always in Anglo-American criminal procedure." Id. at 589.
However, I noted views regarding the American system's inquisitorial techniques. O'Reilly,
supra note 2, at 420 n.103 (referring to Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on the Two Models:
Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1009, 1016 (1974) and
WAYNE LAFAVE &JERoLD IsRAEL, CRIMINAL PROcEDuRE § 1.6, at 37 (1984)).
96 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 564.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 According to Professor Ingraham:
in inquisitorial systems the defendant is expected to be more cooperative and forth-
coming than in adversarial systems; although not required to do so, he is expected to
furnish information to investigators and answer questions at his trial. In adversarial
systems, on the other hand, the defendant is expected to maintain his silence until the
state has produced sufficient proof of his guilt at his trial to shift the burden of persua-
sion to him; even then he continues to have this right if he chooses to exercise it.
INGRAHAM, supra note 10, at 121 (emphasis added) (comparing the American system to
China, France and the Soviet Union).
100 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 589.
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experts,10 ' links the activist state to the inquisitorial system, and the
reactive state to the accusatorial process.'0 2 The activist state seeks to
manage society and fully penetrate social life, and justice serves state
policy. The citizen is an object of state action and a source of evi-
dence, whose testimony is "eagerly sought" and includes the use of
adverse inferences.' 05 The reactive state, by contrast, is a laissezfaire,
limited government, which takes a modest role in managing society,
relying instead on the capitalist system and voluntary associations.
Both England and the United States fit this model. 0 4 In the reactive
state, government stays at arm's length, providing a neutral forum for
solving conflicts between parties, 0 5 who control the process.' 0 6
For Damaska, when a party must testify he is made the source of
evidence and an object of the process. He, thus, can no longer control
the process, or manage his tactical interests.'0 7 Thus, in adversarial
proceedings, such as criminal proceedings in common-law coun-
tries,' 08 "[i]t is the sovereign prerogative of the defendant alone to
decide whether and when to testify in presenting his own case."' 0 9
Damaska thus finds support for the right to silence both in the privi-
lege and the logic of the contest structure." 0 He warns against under-
mining the requirement that a party, such as the state, must carry its
own evidentiary burden: "It is a curious burden indeed that can be
sustained by one side's forcing the opponent to carry the load. As
Roman-canon scholars liked to say, a party to a contest should not be
compelled to become telum adversarii sui, that is, an offensive weapon
of his adversary. 11'
101 Mirjan R. Damaska, Evidentiay Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Proce-
dure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L REv. 506, 571 (1973). Professor Karl Liewellan, for
instance, contrasted "parental" and "arms length" systems. He characterized the former as
having simple procedures, no distrust of officials, and a goal of reintegrating the offender
into society through openness and confession. In the "parental" system, punishment is
viewed as an educational tool. By contrast, in the "arms length" system officials take hold
of a person and attribute a crime to him. There is a distrust of officials, and the goal is not
the offender's reintegration into society, but his punishment. Moreover, redemption is
also seen as too much an invasion of personality. Id.
102 According to Damaska, "the legal process of the reactive state resembles what is
called 'the adversarial process' in common-law cultures and the 'party-governed,' 'contra-
dictory,' or 'accusatorial process' in Continental legal culture." MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE
FACES oFJusTICm AND STATE AuTmoarrv 80 (1986).
103 Id. at 90-91 n.34, 127-30, 164-65.
104 O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 406 n.19; DAMAsKA, supra note 102, at 71-80, 90-91.
105 Id. at 71-80.
106 Id. at 126.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 126-27.
109 Id. at 127.
110 Id. at 127.
M1 Id. at 126.
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VIII. PROTECTING THE INNOCENT FROM CONVICTION
In his desire to shift towards inquisitorial methods by curtailing
the right to silence, reducing both the burden and standard of proof,
and by making it easier for prosecutors to obtain convictions, Profes-
sor Ingraham ignored concerns that such moves increase the risks of
convicting the innocent 11 2 For instance, regarding his own scheme
for curtailing the right to silence, he admitted that "it may be true that
there will be some risk (of convicting the innocent). However, we do
not know this for certain, as the hypothesis has never been tested."" 3
Professor Ingraham's willingness to risk increasing the conviction of
the innocent is not surprising given his view that conviction is no
more serious, or even less serious, than a civil judgment,11 4 and his
view that there is no connection between a system's structure and its
tendency to protect the innocent"n 5 This view contrasts with that of
Damaska, who noted that, while the tension between efficiency and
the protection of individual rights was present in any system, the
"pure adversary model tends to resolve the conflict in a synthesis com-
ing closer to the Due Process ideology than does the non-adversary
model."" 6
Professor Ingraham articulated his view in his 1987 book The
Structure of Criminal Procedure, in which he denied the willingness or
tendency of a totalitarian system-including China-to convict the in-
nocent"n 7 He dismissed concerns about justice in such societies:" 8
112 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 567-68, 587.
113 Id. at 587.
114 Id. at 574-76.
115 Id. at 589; see also INGRAHAM, supra note 10, at 33-34.
116 Damaska, supra note 101, at 577. For Damaska, "[t]he prospect of convicting an
innocent is viewed with so much horror in the Due Process ideology that it is even pre-
pared to sacrifice factfinding precision in the totality of cases." Id. at 576.
117 According to Professor Ingraham:
in non-political cases it is no more in the interest of totalitarian governments than of
any others to have innocent people convicted of crimes they did not commit or guilty
offenders escapejustice .... [For] [n]o government could long endure which did not
at least give the appearance of attempting to do justice.
INGRAHAM, supra note 10, at 33.
118 For instance, Professor Ingraham characterized the American distrust of leaving "too
much to the discretion of officials" as "American parochialism" which, he contended, had
created an "illusion" about totalitarian societies. INGRAHAM, supra note 10, at 33-34 ("[] aws
which invest officials with authority... necessarily restrict that authority;, . . . possession of
great power over a subject people does not necessarily mean that legal procedures for the
processing of criminal cases will be neglected or left to the unregulated discretion of gov-
ernment agents and officials"). Professor Ingraham similarly argued that officials must be
trusted at times to "hedge on the strict application of liberal principles," because legal
repression has generally protected the State from the violence of its enemies. BARTON L
INGRAHAM, POLrMCAL CRIME IN EUROPE Xiii (1979). He also contended that such trust will
not endanger liberty, because "the limited use of legal repression for defensive purposes
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"All fictional accounts of governments so tyrannical that the issue of
guilt or innocence becomes subordinate to the higher goals of dem-
onstrating the regime's absolute power and of eliciting abject submis-
sion to that power (for example, Orwell's 1984) are just that,
fictions."' 19 One such "fiction" was recently played out in China. Be-
tween April and August, 1996, 162,000 people were arrested, and
1,000 were executed in operation "Strike Hard,"120 an operation recal-
ling a comparable 1983 crime crackdown in China in which 10,000
people were executed within a few months.' 21 According to The Econo-
mist, "[r]obbers and other undesirables were rounded up, given a
brief trial, found guilty and usually executed the same day."122 Am-
nesty International warned that coerced confessions and torture
might be in use during the operation, 123 and the New York Times noted
that "[a]n arrest closes off virtually any possibility of a determination
of innocence-a trial is a mere formality."' 24 One Beijing lawyer re-
marked, "I would be disbarred if I tried to defend any criminals
charged under Strike Hard. That is just the way it works here."125
Professor Ingraham also misapprehended my arguments about
why the use of adverse inferences risks increasing the conviction of
the innocent. While he conceded that " [ o]f course, there are other
reasons, consistent with innocence, why people sometimes maintain
silence in the face of an accusation, as O'Reilly points out in his arti-
cle,"' 26 he inaccurately characterized the reasons I presented for this
conclusion. Professor Ingraham pointed to the concern for the inno-
cent who remain silent during interrogation, not because they are
guilty, but because they are informed of their right to silence and fear
no adverse inference from silence in reliance on Miranda and Grif-
fin.127 Professor Ingraham argued that, if these cases were over-
turned, suspects would no longer remain silent in reliance upon
them, and thus erroneous adverse inferences from silence "would be
has not led to the growth of a 'police state.' More often it has been the failure to employ
limited measures of repression during a period of weakness and division which has led to
the polarization of factions within society, the defeat of democracy, and the introduction of
a dictatorial regime." Id.
119 INGRAHAM, supra note 10, at 33.
120 China's Politics of Crime, ECONOMIST, Aug. 10, 1996, at 25.
121 Patrick E. Tyler, Crime (and Punishment) Rages Anew in China, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
1996, at Al.
122 China's Politics of Crime, supra note 120, at 25.
123 Tyler, supra note 121, at Al.
124 Seth Faison, A Case Study: A Man Kills in Apr4 Is Executed in May, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
1996, at A8.
125 China's Politics of Crime supra note 120, at 25.
126 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 568.
127 Id. at 567 n.19.
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sufficiently rare and exceptional as not to render the inference of
guilt an unreasonable one; they would be possibilities, not probabili-
ties."128 He ignored more significant reasons which I discussed ex-
plaining why adverse inferences drawn from silence might be
incorrect:
Some innocent people might remain silent during interrogation be-
cause they are confused, or because they are unable or unprepared to
produce a cogent explanation in the tense environment of a police in-
terrogation. Some... might not be capable of offering persuasive testi-
mony from the witness stand, and in fact may further incriminate
themselves due to excessive nervousness or timidity. Moreover, not all
suspects who remain silent do so because of their guilt. Some remain
silent to protect others. In the Royal Commission's Study, for instance,
in twelve percent of the cases where suspects remained silent, they did so
to protect others. In each of these instances, an inference of guilt from
silence could have resulted in the conviction of an innocent person. 129
Although Professor Ingraham promised no practical benefits
from the new law, he is willing to increase the possibility of convicting
the innocent based upon erroneous adverse inferences. He also
failed to consider the additional risk of increasing the conviction of
the innocent of which the Royal Commission warned, when it noted
that adverse inferences give the police an additional method of pro-
ducing confessions, which could cause weak suspects to confess to
crimes which they did not commit. 30
And the innocent are convicted. In 1987, Radelet and Bedau
maintained that they had documented 350 cases in which innocent
people had been convicted of homicide or rape in America in this
century, that 139 were sentenced to death; twenty-three were exe-
cuted.'31 Even today, with the protections in place that Professor In-
graham views as the "straighjacket of the sixties," the innocent are
still sentenced to death. Within the last ten years in Illinois, for in-
stance, seven men have been exonerated and freed after having been
sent to death row.' 32 In the wake of new habeas corpus reforms, evi-
dence of innocence will likely come too late. This is hardly a time to
increase the risks of convicting the innocent. The procedural safe-
guards of the accusatory system are demonstrably necessary.
128 Id. at 568.
129 O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 450-51.
130 Id. at 450.
131 Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages ofJustice in Potentially Capital Cases,
40 STAN. L. Ray. 21 (1987); see also Richard C. Donnelly, Unconvicting the Innocent, 6 VAND.
L. Rav. 20 (1952) (regarding projections of the percentage of innocent convicted).
132 Ken Armstrong, Bars to justice: In a System Ravenou for Convictions Sometimes the Inno-
cent Don't Walk, CHI. TRIB.,June 23, 1996, at Cl.
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IX. THE HAZARDS OF ABUSE
Professor Ingraham ignored the hazards of abuse in systems that
focus on confessions rather than on extrinsic evidence. England's
new law courts such abuses by turning the justice system's focus away
from extrinsic evidence-such as independent witnesses, fingerprints,
or DNA profiling-and, through the use of adverse inferences, to-
wards obtaining confessions and dubious conclusions about guilt from
silence. As Justice Goldberg noted, this will drive down the system's
reliability and drive up the risk of convicting the innocent 133 This
risk is highlighted by the 1996 Department of Justice survey of cases
where innocent persons were convicted, only to be later exonerated
by DNA profiling.13
Yet Professor Ingraham sought to frame the issue as a question of
whether the use of adverse inferences would "lead to vicious police
brutality... (which) ... allegedly goes on." 35 He gave no page refer-
ence to my article in this instance, because I did not make this straw
man contention. Rather, I suggested that England's shift towards in-
quisitorial methods "undermines the accusatorial system's protection
of individuals from humiliation and abuse at the hands of government
investigators. The inquisitorial system tempts law enforcement of-
ficers to use inhumane and unreliable methods to obtain confes-
sions-a temptation which has been the source of miscarriages of
justice."136
As I pointed out, the Royal Commission and English commenta-
tors had expressed concern over the new law's increased focus on in-
terrogation in the wake of interrogation abuses that had resulted in a
number of miscarriages of justice in England. 137 While Professor In-
graham made light of such concerns, 38 there is ample literature in
England and America documenting them.' 39 I also pointed out that
133 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 489 (1964).
134 See generally, Edward Connors et al., U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES,
EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNO-
CENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996).
135 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 592-93.
136 O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 450. See also id. at 421.
137 Id. at 421, 426, 450. Such cases keep recurring as a series of 1997 cases makes clear.
See, e.g., Youssef M. Ibrahim, Once Again, Britain Frees PeopleJaikd by Mistake, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
22, 1997, at A4 (In one case, "police tricked" Patrick Malloy, who died in prison, into
making a false confession.).
138 Ingraham, supra note 1, at 592.
139 See, e.g., GisLi H. GuDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS
AND TESTIMONY (1992); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86J. CRuM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 621, 692 n.288 (1996) (reviewing examples of interrogation abuses and false
confessions); StephenJ. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 435 (1987);
Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda. A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 VAND. L REV. 1, 12-16
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the recent Italian experience illustrates how the focus on interroga-
tion can lead to abuse. In 1988, concerns about inquisitorial methods
prompted the Italian Parliament to limit inquisitorial tendencies by
adopting elements of an accusatorial system.14° After the reforms, the
detention of suspects for investigation and interrogation has contin-
ued to raise questions about abuses. For instance, the state has alleg-
edly used detention to coerce suspects to confess and to testify against
co-conspirators. These allegations came to light after a number of
prominent suspects in a corruption investigation committed suicide
while in detention. 141 In 1995, Italy moved to curb similar abuses by
requiring the videotaping of interrogations. 42 Similar programs are
already in operation in the United States.143 In 1992, Argentina also
moved away from its inquisitorial tradition and adopted accusatorial
elements into its criminal justice system, including measures to
counter abusive interrogation tactics.' 44 Under the law, police of-
ficers must advise prisoners of their right to counsel, and to remain
silent until the lawyer or ajudge arrives. 145 Police must also notify a
judge of an arrest within six hours.' 46
Belittling the hazards of abuse, Professor Ingraham suggested
curtailing the right to silence without substituting new protections to
counter abuses. Even in England, this draconian approach was re-
jected. Instead, years before restricting the right to silence, England
adopted measures aimed at preventing abuse during interrogation in
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 (PACE).147 Some schol-
ars have referred to this approach as "exchange abolition:" in ex-
change for abolishing the right, the police allow attorneys to advise
suspects during interrogation and audio or videotape interroga-
(1986); Serge Schmemann, Israel Renews Its Permission for the Use ofForce in Interrogations, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 17, 1995, at AS.
The temptations to coerce are not limited by national boundaries. See Tim Wiener,
C.I.A. Taught Coercion to 5 Latin American Forces, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 22, 1997, at A6; Gary Cohn
& Ginger Thompson, CL4 Linked to Rights Abuses, CHICAGO SuN-TMEs, Jan. 28, 1997, at 12
(CIA taught physical coercion methods).
140 O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 447.
14' Id.
142 Law of Aug. 8, 1995, modifying Italian Code of Criminal Procedure (C.P.P.), in GAzz.
UF'., Aug. 8, 1995; see also Vi-eo-Interogatori IL SOLE, Aug. 5, 1995, at 24.
143 Interrogations are videotaped in Alaska and Minnesota. See WiwlA A. GELLER, U.S.
DEP'T. OF JUSTIcE, VIDEOTAPING INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS (1993); see also Leo,
supra note 139, at 621 (suggesting videotaping of interrogations).
144 Ed McCullough, Argentines Now Have the Open Trials Common Elsewhere, AP INT'L.
NEws, Nov. 9, 1992; see also Gregory W. O'Reilly, Opening up Argentina ; Courts, 80JUDIA-
TURE 1 (March-Apr. 1997).
145 McCullough, supra note 144.
146 Id.
147 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, ch. 60 (Eng.).
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tions.14s The idea is not new. In America during the 1930's, Kauper
proposed discouraging abuse during interrogation by recording judi-
cial examinations of the accused in place of police interrogation. 149
Contrary to the English proponents of limiting the right to si-
lence, and even contrary to the experience of some inquisitorial sys-
tems, Professor Ingraham failed to recognize what John Henry
Wigmore-no cheerleader for the right to silence-noted: "[t] he ex-
ercise of the power to extract answers begets a forgetfulness of the just
limitations of that power. The simple and peaceful process of ques-
tioning breeds a readiness to resort to bullying and to physical force
and torture."' 50 Ignoring this, Professor Ingraham, stands far away
even from a scholar like Professor David Dolinko, who is critical of any
principled foundation for the privilege against self-incrimination, yet
does not counsel its abolition. Dolinko recognizes its "important
functions in the legal system as a whole, so that its repeal would do
violence to the entire system."151
X. CONCLUSION
In general, an inquisitorial system and an accusatorial system,
such as ours, differ as to whether there is a duty to talk or a right to
silence. In the former, a duty to talk may logically entail a sanction for
its breach, while in the latter, there can logically be no sanction for
silence, since no duty exists or is breached; a right is claimed. Con-
trary to Professor Ingraham's assertions, a number of writers besides
myself have put forth reasonable arguments supporting the view that
there are distinct tendencies in the nature of governments, which
track the distinctions between the accusatory and inquisitorial justice
systems. A number of writers besides myself have also put forth rea-
sonable arguments that England's new duty to talk and sanction for
silence curtails the right to silence, undermines the burden of proof,
erodes the presumption of innocence, and pushes the justice system
from the accusatorial towards the inquisitorial model. On the other
hand, if, as Professor Ingraham believes, there are no practical effects
from curtailing the right to silence, no increase in confessions or con-
148 Greer, supra note 81, at 718.
149 Kamisar, supra note 79, at 85-86 (quoting Kauper).
150 JOHN H. WIGMORE, 8 EVIDENCE § 2251 (3d ed. 1940), quoted in StephenJ. SchuIhofer,
Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. R V. 435, 451 (1987). "Wigmore later defended the
privilege, narrowly understood, because of its contribution to preventing official cruelty in
obtaining evidence." Donald A. Dripps, Self-Incrimination and Seif-Presemvation: A Skeptical
View, 1991 U. ILL. L. REy. 329 n.1 (citing JOHN H. WiGMORE, 8 EVIDENCE § 2250 (1st ed.
1904)).
151 David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Priviledge Against Self-Incrimination?, 33
UCLA L. REy. 1063, 1063 (1986).
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victions, and no reduction in crime, it seems unreasonable for society
to risk the costs of such a change, such as increasing the conviction of
the innocent and abuse by officials, and the accretion of government
power at the expense of individuals' privacy and autonomy.
